Description and Details
The failure of Texas’ power grid in February, 2021 was one of the most severe energy crises in U.S. history, leaving millions without power for days in freezing temperatures. The roots of this disaster lie in Texas’ unique power grid and approach to energy regulation, with a legacy of deregulation going back to the 1990s (Krauss, 2021). At that time, the state dismantled its centralized utility model in favor of a competitive, market-based system of private generators, transmission operators, and energy retailers (Krauss, 2021). The goal was to lower consumers’ costs and foster innovation, however, the system lacked financial incentives for maintenance, requirements for weatherproofing infrastructure, and effective oversight (Krauss, 2021). These deficits left the system exposed to the catastrophic storm of 2021.
The storm brought record-breaking cold and extreme weather conditions that overwhelmed the state’s power infrastructure. As temperatures plummeted, demand for electricity surged while nearly half the grid’s generating capacity failed (Krauss, 2021). Wind turbines froze, natural gas pipelines and storage facilities were crippled, and power plants faltered (Krauss, 2021). Over the course of just four hours on February 15th, 40% of the grid’s capacity went offline, forcing the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)–the nonprofit managing the state’s grid– to implement rolling blackouts (Krauss, 2021). At the height of the catastrophe, over 52,000 megawatts of power capacity were offline and 4.5 million homes and businesses lost power, with some outages lasting for days (Krauss, 2021). ERCOT later revealed that the grid was just 4 minutes and 37 seconds from a complete statewide blackout which could have taken weeks to restore and had disastrous effects on grid infrastructure and equipment (Johnson, 2021).
Several key players’ decisions and inaction created the conditions for the havoc the storm was able to wreak on Texas’ power grid. ERCOT, tasked with managing 90% of the state’s power grid, bears substantial responsibility for their poor preparation and decision making during the storm. Some claim their calls to conserve energy were too little, too late. Furthermore, ERCOT overcharged power companies by $16 billion during the storm, keeping electricity prices at the maximum rate for two days after the outages had mostly ended–an error that largely fell on the shoulders of consumers to pay up and forced some energy retailers into bankruptcy (Douglas, 2021). The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) appointed by Governor Greg Abbott, which oversees ERCOT and the state’s utility providers, was also heavily criticized for dismantling oversight mechanisms that could have mitigated the crisis (Dexheimer, 2021). Specifically, they eliminated the Oversight and Enforcement division just months before the storm and severed ties with the Texas Reliability Entity, an independent monitor of the grid’s reliability (Dexheimer, 2021). These actions weakened enforcement of weatherization standards and failed to establish a reserve margin– extra power capacity above expected demand that could have provided critical backup during the storm. After the storm, PUC Chairwoman DeAnn T. Walker and the other commissioners resigned due to the bipartisan backlash over their failures (Nowlin, 2021; Rojas, 2021). ERCOT leadership was also dismissed. Finally, Texas’ refusal to connect their power grid to interstate power-sharing networks in order to avoid federal regulation amplified the crisis (Krauss, 2021).
The Texas power grid failure was a clear example of the breakdown of transformative community engagement (TCE) and how it can lead to disastrous outcomes. Engineers, governments, and utility companies should be held to the high standards of TCE in order to most equitably serve their communities. TCE design is a practice that aims to create equitable systems by giving community members more power over the policies and forces that affect their lives. TCE consists of three main pillars: active listening, collaboration and shared purpose, and openness and learning.
The first pillar, active listening, was fundamentally broken in this crisis. Despite warnings from federal authorities about the vulnerability of Texas’ energy infrastructure, particularly its lack of winterization, these concerns were largely ignored by ERCOT. Community members, especially those in more vulnerable regions, were also not sufficiently heard. Local residents were left in the dark, both literally and figuratively, during the outages, with little communication about what was happening or when power would be restored. Had there been active listening to both expert warnings and the lived experiences of residents, steps might have been taken earlier to weatherize infrastructure and ensure the grid was prepared for extreme cold. This failure to listen resulted in an avoidable crisis that deeply affected millions.
The second pillar, collaboration and shared purpose, was also absent during this event. In an ideal scenario, various stakeholders—ERCOT, utility companies, state regulators, and local governments—would have worked together toward the common goal of ensuring a resilient, reliable power grid for all Texans. However, the Texas grid operates as an isolated entity, intentionally disconnected from other states’ power grids to avoid federal oversight, and this lack of interconnection exacerbated the crisis. Additionally, the state’s deregulated energy market fostered competition over cooperation, which contributed to the breakdown of collaboration. There was no unified approach to addressing the surge in demand during the storm or the crippling failures of the energy infrastructure. Instead, decisions were made in isolation, and the failure to align on a shared purpose left the system unprepared for the catastrophe that unfolded.
Finally, the principle of openness and learning was egregiously ignored throughout the crisis. After the storm, instead of fostering an open dialogue about what went wrong, ERCOT and state regulators were slow to acknowledge their mistakes, and there was little transparency in how decisions were made or how funds were allocated. For example, ERCOT’s decision to overcharge power companies during the crisis, keeping prices at the maximum level for days after the worst of the outages, reflected a lack of accountability. The PUC’s dismantling of oversight mechanisms before the storm further diminished any capacity for reflection or learning. Had there been an openness to learning from past experiences (notably the 2011 snowstorm that caused rolling blackouts in Texas) or to critically analyzing failures in real-time, corrective actions might have been taken more swiftly, preventing further harm. The lack of transparency and failure to engage in honest reflection compounded public distrust and left the system ill-prepared for future challenges.
There are several ways this crisis could have been better managed or prevented and many can learn from this incident. A priority should have been to identify and provide temporary solutions for those at greatest risk due to the crisis. These groups include those reliant on electricity-dependent medical equipment, need access to a running refrigerator for medications, elderly, and disadvantaged groups (low income, communities of color, and those with language barriers) who may have less resources to get through the crisis or will face the most challenges afterwards due to pre-existing disadvantages. There also should have been checks and balances in place to hold ERCOT and the PUC accountable for continuing to overcharge power companies and Texas residents rather than communicate the crisis and adjust energy costs accordingly. Connecting the Texas power grid to the rest of the country may prevent this situation from repeating itself, as Texas’ isolation without adequate power margin has repeatedly resulted in widespread outages. Overall, Texans were failed during this crisis and it is important to listen to the wants and needs of the Texas community.
The 2021 Texas power grid failure was an event that showcased the consequences of neglecting the pillars of TCE including active listening, collaboration and shared purpose, and openness and learning. The crisis showed us how vulnerable the Texas energy system is and the consequences of that vulnerability. Better communication and management of the event could prevent a future crisis as well as truly taking into account the opinions of Texans in future events.
Discussion Questions
- If Texas had been connected to the national power grid, how would this crisis have developed differently?
- Brainstorm potential areas for federal intervention. If you had the chance, what ONE thing would you implement to prevent the damages?
- What needs to be done today to prevent this from happening again?
- Are there any other similar cases of systemic deregulation harming large communities?
References
Dexheimer, E., & Root, J. (2021, February 26). “Muzzled and eviscerated”: Critics say Abbott
appointees gutted enforcement of Texas Grid Rules. Houston Chronicle. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/texas/article/critics-abbott-power-grid-rules-texas-deadly-storm-15982421.php
Douglas, E., & Ferman, M. (2021, March 4). ERCOT overcharged power companies $16 billion
for electricity during winter freeze, firm says. The Texas Tribune. https://www.texastribune.org/2021/03/04/ercot-texas-electricity-16-billion/
Gold, R. (2022, February). The Texas Electric Grid Failure was a warm-up. Texas Monthly. . https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-electric-grid-failure-warm-up/
Johnson, B. (2021, February 24). Texas Grid Was 4 minutes and 37 Seconds from a Statewide
Blackout, Per ERCOT. The Texan. https://thetexan.news/issues/energy/texas-grid-was-4-minutes-and-37-seconds-from-a-statewide-blackout-per-ercot/article_46b50cb0-d35c-5b60-a38e-5860efb0c863.html
Krauss, C., Fernandez, M., Penn, I., & Rojas, R. (2021, February 21). How Texas’ Drive for
Energy Independence Set It Up for Disaster. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/21/us/texas-electricity-ercot-blackouts.html
Masters, G. M. (2013). Renewable and Efficient Electric Power Systems (Second Edition). John
Wiley & Sons Inc.
Nowlin, S. (2021, March 17). Texas’ last PUC member resigns after recording catches him
reassuring utility investors. San Antonio Current. https://web.archive.org/web/20210606230132/https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2021/03/17/texas-last-puc-member-resigns-after-recording-catches-him-reassuring-utility-investors
Oberg, K., Srinivas, A., Rahman, F., Wang, Z., & Ranganathan, P. (2023). Strengthening Grid . Resilience: Lessons from the Texas Power Blackout and Implications. 2023 North . American Power Symposium (NAPS), 1–6. . https://doi.org/10.1109/naps58826.2023.10318534
Rojas, R. (2021, March 2). Leader of Texas Utility Regulator Resigns After Extensive Storm
Outages. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/us/deann-walker-resigns-puc-texas.html
Shrestha, S., Panchalogaranjan, V., & Moses, P. (2023). The February 2021 U.S. Southwest
power crisis. Electric Power Systems Research, 217.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2023.109124
This case study was developed by a group of 4 students: Abigail Monahan, Owen Baldwin, Leslie Guzman, and Adam Nix as a component of Umich CEE 465 Environmental Process Engineering. The detailed description above is pasted from the majority of our report: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mO4e3pscQCLYpizZ0nI5Q-0OAHDwfrIAtrMXon3c5eg/edit?usp=sharinghttps://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1Q9qMIIGwkKg7rNkFY9SpEqWUfFs4Vn1bJopiw10KV‑Q/edit?usp=sharing