Description and Details

The fail­ure of Texas’ pow­er grid in Feb­ru­ary, 2021 was one of the most severe ener­gy crises in U.S. his­to­ry, leav­ing mil­lions with­out pow­er for days in freez­ing tem­per­a­tures. The roots of this dis­as­ter lie in Texas’ unique pow­er grid and approach to ener­gy reg­u­la­tion, with a lega­cy of dereg­u­la­tion going back to the 1990s (Krauss, 2021). At that time, the state dis­man­tled its cen­tral­ized util­i­ty mod­el in favor of a com­pet­i­tive, mar­ket-based sys­tem of pri­vate gen­er­a­tors, trans­mis­sion oper­a­tors, and ener­gy retail­ers (Krauss, 2021). The goal was to low­er con­sumers’ costs and fos­ter inno­va­tion, how­ev­er, the sys­tem lacked finan­cial incen­tives for main­te­nance, require­ments for weath­er­proof­ing infra­struc­ture, and effec­tive over­sight (Krauss, 2021). These deficits left the sys­tem exposed to the cat­a­stroph­ic storm of 2021.
The storm brought record-break­ing cold and extreme weath­er con­di­tions that over­whelmed the state’s pow­er infra­struc­ture. As tem­per­a­tures plum­met­ed, demand for elec­tric­i­ty surged while near­ly half the grid’s gen­er­at­ing capac­i­ty failed (Krauss, 2021). Wind tur­bines froze, nat­ur­al gas pipelines and stor­age facil­i­ties were crip­pled, and pow­er plants fal­tered (Krauss, 2021). Over the course of just four hours on Feb­ru­ary 15th, 40% of the grid’s capac­i­ty went offline, forc­ing the Elec­tric Reli­a­bil­i­ty Coun­cil of Texas (ERCOT)–the non­prof­it man­ag­ing the state’s grid– to imple­ment rolling black­outs (Krauss, 2021). At the height of the cat­a­stro­phe, over 52,000 megawatts of pow­er capac­i­ty were offline and 4.5 mil­lion homes and busi­ness­es lost pow­er, with some out­ages last­ing for days (Krauss, 2021). ERCOT lat­er revealed that the grid was just 4 min­utes and 37 sec­onds from a com­plete statewide black­out which could have tak­en weeks to restore and had dis­as­trous effects on grid infra­struc­ture and equip­ment (John­son, 2021).
Sev­er­al key play­ers’ deci­sions and inac­tion cre­at­ed the con­di­tions for the hav­oc the storm was able to wreak on Texas’ pow­er grid. ERCOT, tasked with man­ag­ing 90% of the state’s pow­er grid, bears sub­stan­tial respon­si­bil­i­ty for their poor prepa­ra­tion and deci­sion mak­ing dur­ing the storm. Some claim their calls to con­serve ener­gy were too lit­tle, too late. Fur­ther­more, ERCOT over­charged pow­er com­pa­nies by $16 bil­lion dur­ing the storm, keep­ing elec­tric­i­ty prices at the max­i­mum rate for two days after the out­ages had most­ly ended–an error that large­ly fell on the shoul­ders of con­sumers to pay up and forced some ener­gy retail­ers into bank­rupt­cy (Dou­glas, 2021). The Pub­lic Util­i­ty Com­mis­sion of Texas (PUC) appoint­ed by Gov­er­nor Greg Abbott, which over­sees ERCOT and the state’s util­i­ty providers, was also heav­i­ly crit­i­cized for dis­man­tling over­sight mech­a­nisms that could have mit­i­gat­ed the cri­sis (Dex­heimer, 2021). Specif­i­cal­ly, they elim­i­nat­ed the Over­sight and Enforce­ment divi­sion just months before the storm and sev­ered ties with the Texas Reli­a­bil­i­ty Enti­ty, an inde­pen­dent mon­i­tor of the grid’s reli­a­bil­i­ty (Dex­heimer, 2021). These actions weak­ened enforce­ment of weath­er­iza­tion stan­dards and failed to estab­lish a reserve mar­gin– extra pow­er capac­i­ty above expect­ed demand that could have pro­vid­ed crit­i­cal back­up dur­ing the storm. After the storm, PUC Chair­woman DeAnn T. Walk­er and the oth­er com­mis­sion­ers resigned due to the bipar­ti­san back­lash over their fail­ures (Nowl­in, 2021; Rojas, 2021). ERCOT lead­er­ship was also dis­missed. Final­ly, Texas’ refusal to con­nect their pow­er grid to inter­state pow­er-shar­ing net­works in order to avoid fed­er­al reg­u­la­tion ampli­fied the cri­sis (Krauss, 2021).
The Texas pow­er grid fail­ure was a clear exam­ple of the break­down of trans­for­ma­tive com­mu­ni­ty engage­ment (TCE) and how it can lead to dis­as­trous out­comes. Engi­neers, gov­ern­ments, and util­i­ty com­pa­nies should be held to the high stan­dards of TCE in order to most equi­tably serve their com­mu­ni­ties. TCE design is a prac­tice that aims to cre­ate equi­table sys­tems by giv­ing com­mu­ni­ty mem­bers more pow­er over the poli­cies and forces that affect their lives. TCE con­sists of three main pil­lars: active lis­ten­ing, col­lab­o­ra­tion and shared pur­pose, and open­ness and learning.
The first pil­lar, active lis­ten­ing, was fun­da­men­tal­ly bro­ken in this cri­sis. Despite warn­ings from fed­er­al author­i­ties about the vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty of Texas’ ener­gy infra­struc­ture, par­tic­u­lar­ly its lack of win­ter­i­za­tion, these con­cerns were large­ly ignored by ERCOT. Com­mu­ni­ty mem­bers, espe­cial­ly those in more vul­ner­a­ble regions, were also not suf­fi­cient­ly heard. Local res­i­dents were left in the dark, both lit­er­al­ly and fig­u­ra­tive­ly, dur­ing the out­ages, with lit­tle com­mu­ni­ca­tion about what was hap­pen­ing or when pow­er would be restored. Had there been active lis­ten­ing to both expert warn­ings and the lived expe­ri­ences of res­i­dents, steps might have been tak­en ear­li­er to weath­er­ize infra­struc­ture and ensure the grid was pre­pared for extreme cold. This fail­ure to lis­ten result­ed in an avoid­able cri­sis that deeply affect­ed millions.
The sec­ond pil­lar, col­lab­o­ra­tion and shared pur­pose, was also absent dur­ing this event. In an ide­al sce­nario, var­i­ous stakeholders—ERCOT, util­i­ty com­pa­nies, state reg­u­la­tors, and local governments—would have worked togeth­er toward the com­mon goal of ensur­ing a resilient, reli­able pow­er grid for all Tex­ans. How­ev­er, the Texas grid oper­ates as an iso­lat­ed enti­ty, inten­tion­al­ly dis­con­nect­ed from oth­er states’ pow­er grids to avoid fed­er­al over­sight, and this lack of inter­con­nec­tion exac­er­bat­ed the cri­sis. Addi­tion­al­ly, the state’s dereg­u­lat­ed ener­gy mar­ket fos­tered com­pe­ti­tion over coop­er­a­tion, which con­tributed to the break­down of col­lab­o­ra­tion. There was no uni­fied approach to address­ing the surge in demand dur­ing the storm or the crip­pling fail­ures of the ener­gy infra­struc­ture. Instead, deci­sions were made in iso­la­tion, and the fail­ure to align on a shared pur­pose left the sys­tem unpre­pared for the cat­a­stro­phe that unfolded.
Final­ly, the prin­ci­ple of open­ness and learn­ing was egre­gious­ly ignored through­out the cri­sis. After the storm, instead of fos­ter­ing an open dia­logue about what went wrong, ERCOT and state reg­u­la­tors were slow to acknowl­edge their mis­takes, and there was lit­tle trans­paren­cy in how deci­sions were made or how funds were allo­cat­ed. For exam­ple, ERCOT’s deci­sion to over­charge pow­er com­pa­nies dur­ing the cri­sis, keep­ing prices at the max­i­mum lev­el for days after the worst of the out­ages, reflect­ed a lack of account­abil­i­ty. The PUC’s dis­man­tling of over­sight mech­a­nisms before the storm fur­ther dimin­ished any capac­i­ty for reflec­tion or learn­ing. Had there been an open­ness to learn­ing from past expe­ri­ences (notably the 2011 snow­storm that caused rolling black­outs in Texas) or to crit­i­cal­ly ana­lyz­ing fail­ures in real-time, cor­rec­tive actions might have been tak­en more swift­ly, pre­vent­ing fur­ther harm. The lack of trans­paren­cy and fail­ure to engage in hon­est reflec­tion com­pound­ed pub­lic dis­trust and left the sys­tem ill-pre­pared for future challenges.

There are sev­er­al ways this cri­sis could have been bet­ter man­aged or pre­vent­ed and many can learn from this inci­dent. A pri­or­i­ty should have been to iden­ti­fy and pro­vide tem­po­rary solu­tions for those at great­est risk due to the cri­sis. These groups include those reliant on elec­tric­i­ty-depen­dent med­ical equip­ment, need access to a run­ning refrig­er­a­tor for med­ica­tions, elder­ly, and dis­ad­van­taged groups (low income, com­mu­ni­ties of col­or, and those with lan­guage bar­ri­ers) who may have less resources to get through the cri­sis or will face the most chal­lenges after­wards due to pre-exist­ing dis­ad­van­tages. There also should have been checks and bal­ances in place to hold ERCOT and the PUC account­able for con­tin­u­ing to over­charge pow­er com­pa­nies and Texas res­i­dents rather than com­mu­ni­cate the cri­sis and adjust ener­gy costs accord­ing­ly. Con­nect­ing the Texas pow­er grid to the rest of the coun­try may pre­vent this sit­u­a­tion from repeat­ing itself, as Texas’ iso­la­tion with­out ade­quate pow­er mar­gin has repeat­ed­ly result­ed in wide­spread out­ages. Over­all, Tex­ans were failed dur­ing this cri­sis and it is impor­tant to lis­ten to the wants and needs of the Texas community.
The 2021 Texas pow­er grid fail­ure was an event that show­cased the con­se­quences of neglect­ing the pil­lars of TCE includ­ing active lis­ten­ing, col­lab­o­ra­tion and shared pur­pose, and open­ness and learn­ing. The cri­sis showed us how vul­ner­a­ble the Texas ener­gy sys­tem is and the con­se­quences of that vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty. Bet­ter com­mu­ni­ca­tion and man­age­ment of the event could pre­vent a future cri­sis as well as tru­ly tak­ing into account the opin­ions of Tex­ans in future events.

Discussion Questions

  1. If Texas had been con­nect­ed to the nation­al pow­er grid, how would this cri­sis have devel­oped differently?
  2. Brain­storm poten­tial areas for fed­er­al inter­ven­tion. If you had the chance, what ONE thing would you imple­ment to pre­vent the damages?
  3. What needs to be done today to pre­vent this from hap­pen­ing again?
  4. Are there any oth­er sim­i­lar cas­es of sys­temic dereg­u­la­tion harm­ing large communities?

References

Dex­heimer, E., & Root, J. (2021, Feb­ru­ary 26). “Muz­zled and evis­cer­at­ed”: Crit­ics say Abbott
appointees gut­ted enforce­ment of Texas Grid Rules. Hous­ton Chron­i­cle. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/texas/article/critics-abbott-power-grid-rules-texas-deadly-storm-15982421.php

Dou­glas, E., & Fer­man, M. (2021, March 4). ERCOT over­charged pow­er com­pa­nies $16 billion
for elec­tric­i­ty dur­ing win­ter freeze, firm says. The Texas Tri­bune. https://www.texastribune.org/2021/03/04/ercot-texas-electricity-16-billion/
Gold, R. (2022, Feb­ru­ary). The Texas Elec­tric Grid Fail­ure was a warm-up. Texas Month­ly. . https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-electric-grid-failure-warm-up/
John­son, B. (2021, Feb­ru­ary 24). Texas Grid Was 4 min­utes and 37 Sec­onds from a Statewide
Black­out, Per ERCOT. The Tex­an. https://thetexan.news/issues/energy/texas-grid-was-4-minutes-and-37-seconds-from-a-statewide-blackout-per-ercot/article_46b50cb0-d35c-5b60-a38e-5860efb0c863.html

Krauss, C., Fer­nan­dez, M., Penn, I., & Rojas, R. (2021, Feb­ru­ary 21). How Texas’ Dri­ve for
Ener­gy Inde­pen­dence Set It Up for Dis­as­ter. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/21/us/texas-electricity-ercot-blackouts.html

Mas­ters, G. M. (2013). Renew­able and Effi­cient Elec­tric Pow­er Sys­tems (Sec­ond Edi­tion). John
Wiley & Sons Inc.

Nowl­in, S. (2021, March 17). Texas’ last PUC mem­ber resigns after record­ing catch­es him
reas­sur­ing util­i­ty investors. San Anto­nio Cur­rent. https://web.archive.org/web/20210606230132/https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2021/03/17/texas-last-puc-member-resigns-after-recording-catches-him-reassuring-utility-investors
Oberg, K., Srini­vas, A., Rah­man, F., Wang, Z., & Ran­ganathan, P. (2023). Strength­en­ing Grid . Resilience: Lessons from the Texas Pow­er Black­out and Impli­ca­tions. 2023 North . Amer­i­can Pow­er Sym­po­sium (NAPS), 1–6. . https://doi.org/10.1109/naps58826.2023.10318534
Rojas, R. (2021, March 2). Leader of Texas Util­i­ty Reg­u­la­tor Resigns After Exten­sive Storm
Out­ages. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/us/deann-walker-resigns-puc-texas.html

Shrestha, S., Pan­chalog­a­ran­jan, V., & Moses, P. (2023). The Feb­ru­ary 2021 U.S. Southwest
pow­er cri­sis. Elec­tric Pow­er Sys­tems Research, 217.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2023.109124

This case study was devel­oped by a group of 4 stu­dents: Abi­gail Mon­a­han, Owen Bald­win, Leslie Guz­man, and Adam Nix as a com­po­nent of Umich CEE 465 Envi­ron­men­tal Process Engi­neer­ing. The detailed descrip­tion above is past­ed from the major­i­ty of our report: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mO4e3pscQCLYpizZ0nI5Q-0OAHDwfrIAtrMXon3c5eg/edit?usp=sharinghttps://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1Q9qMIIGwkKg7rNkFY9SpEqWUfFs4Vn1bJopiw10KV‑Q/edit?usp=sharing